On January 29, 2025, the First Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. v. Bourke, --- F.4th ---, 2025 WL 325872 (1st Cir. 2025), wherein the Court made clear, in no uncertain terms, that the statutes conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the Massachusetts Land Court over matters concerning title to registered land cannot divest the federal court of diversity jurisdiction over such matters. The Court of Appeals recognized that, under the U.S. Constitution, “only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 3 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004)). Because “jurisdiction is determined by the law of the court’s creation” and Congress created federal diversity jurisdiction, the subject-matter jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in diversity “cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial operation of a [state] statute . . ., even though it created the right of action.” Id. at 3-*4 (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 314 (2006) (alteration in original)).
Additionally, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendants’ argument that, prior to the commencement of the underlying action, they had already invoked the Land Court’s jurisdiction over the matter by registering a Statement of Adverse Claim on title to the property at issue. The defendants’ argument arises out of the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction, which requires that “[w]hen one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the same res.” Id. at *5 (quoting Marshall, 547 U.S. at 311). Pursuant to G.L. c. 185, § 112, a party claiming a right or interest in registered land may make a written statement setting forth the basis for their interest and, if such statement is registered on title, any party-in-interest may file a motion in the Land Court to resolve the claim. See id. The Court of Appeals recognized that, although the defendants registered their Statement of Adverse Claim on title to the property at issue, no party-in-interest had filed a motion in the Land Court to resolve the defendants’ alleged adverse claim of title. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals determined that the Land Court had not exercised jurisdiction over the defendants’ claim of adverse title so as to invoke the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction.

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